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I. INTRODUCTION
Do the United States of America and its Supreme Court have anything to
learn from modern Europe regarding the freedom of religion? Should
Europe look to U.S. jurisprudence for guidance on interpreting its own
religious freedom protections?
In the twenty-first century, the European Court of Human Rights
(European Court) has been making controversial headlines in its religion
jurisprudence. It has ruled that Italy may hang crucifixes in government-run
schools,1 but also that Switzerland can prevent Muslim teachers from
wearing the hijab in its public schools.2 The European Court has allowed
France to ban the Islamic burqa in public places,3 but it also has required the
United Kingdom to allow a flight attendant to wear a Christian necklace at
work.4 These and other important decisions have caught the attention of
constitutional scholars, who often draw comparisons between these cases and
the religion jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.5 But are such
comparisons valid? This Article will explore that query in a systematic
fashion.
One may question—and indeed, Justice Antonin Scalia repeatedly did
so6—why the Supreme Court ever would consult “foreign precedent,”7
particularly when the Court is interpreting the U.S. Constitution on a purely
domestic issue, such as the freedom of religion. Allowing foreign judges to
influence modern interpretations of domestic U.S. law seems to ignore the
1

See Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61 (Mar. 18, 2011).
See Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447 (Feb. 15, 2001).
3
See S.A.S. v. France, App. no. 43835/111, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 1, 2014).
4
See Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215 (Jan. 15, 2013).
5
See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Pasquale Annicchino, Cross, Crucifix, Culture: An
Approach to the Constitutional Meaning of Confessional Symbols, 13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
71 (2014); William P. Marshall, The Lautsi Decision and the American Establishment Clause
Experience: A Response to Professor Weiler, 65 ME. L. REV. 769 (2013); John Witte, Jr. &
Nina-Louisa Arold, Lift High the Cross?: Contrasting the New European and American Cases
on Religious Symbols on Government Property, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 5 (2011); Andrea
Pin, (European) Stars or (American) Stripes: Are the European Court of Human Rights’
Neutrality and the Supreme Court’s Wall of Separation One and the Same?, 85 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 627 (2011).
6
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
basic premise . . . that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world . . . ought to be rejected out of hand.”).
7
“Foreign precedent” refers to “decisions of foreign courts interpreting their domestic
laws [or] . . . issues of international law, decisions of supranational tribunals interpreting
domestic issues of a particular country, and decisions of a supranational tribunal interpreting a
supranational constitution or bill of rights.” Osmar J. Benvenuto, Note, Reevaluating the
Debate Surrounding the Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Precedent, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2695, 2701 (2006). The term does not refer to English common law, the backbone of U.S.
law. Id. at 2702–03.
2
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notion that the American colonies broke their ties with European ideas and
practices in a fiery revolution. Indeed, many in the United States today still
promote the concept of American exceptionalism that Alexis de Tocqueville
noted early in the nation’s history.8 Having thrown off the shackles of
Europe, should the Supreme Court now embrace those same old ideas and
repatriate them to American soil?
While many scholars today compare religion cases in the United States
and Europe, no one has yet addressed in detail why that practice is
legitimate. This Article tackles that issue by defending the practice of
consulting foreign precedent, within reasonable limits. It breaks down the
problem into three parts, looking first at policy-based objections to the
practice. It then explores whether differences between the U.S. and
European systems invalidate these comparisons. Finally, it considers
whether the subject-matter of religion—as protected by the U.S. Constitution
and the European Convention on Human Rights—makes such comparisons
futile. The Article concludes there is value in consulting foreign precedent
on religion. Indeed, Europe and the United States may have a few lessons to
teach one another about the value of religion in modern, pluralistic
democracies.
II. POLICY-BASED LIMITS ON COMPARING THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN
MODELS
Regarding the reliance on foreign precedent in modern Supreme Court
decisions, Justice Scalia passionately argued:
[I]rrelevant are the practices of the “world community,” whose
notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our
people. . . .” Where there is not first a settled consensus among
our own people, the views of other nations, however
enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be,
cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.”9
Surely he is correct that foreign precedent cannot be imposed upon the
Supreme Court, but does that mean foreign jurisprudence must have no role
at all, even as a reference point?
8
See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 32 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Debra Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000) (“The civilization of New England has been like those
fires lit in the hills that, after having spread heat around them, still tinge the furthest reaches of
the horizon with their light.”).
9
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868–69, n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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A policy debate is raging about the propriety of drawing lessons for the
U.S. Supreme Court from foreign sources, such as the European Court. In
recent years, some politicians have bemoaned official references to foreign
precedent in U.S. jurisprudence.10 The issue has garnered so much attention
that Republicans in Congress (unsuccessfully) introduced legislation in 2004
and 2005 that would have prohibited federal courts from using “foreign
authorities except in special circumstances where the foreign law ‘informs an
understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United States.’ ”11
Some worry that uniquely American ideas will be tarnished if exposed to the
brushstrokes of a European system that never understood American values.
Indeed, all this controversy about foreign precedent in domestic legal
interpretation has generated serious scholarship on both sides of the
argument,12 yet no one has systematically tackled the issue in the specific
context of the courts’ jurisprudence on religion.
From a historical perspective, the Framers considered foreign law when
designing the U.S. Constitution; however, judges in that founding generation
generally did not find it appropriate to consult foreign sources when
interpreting the Constitution.13 It is no surprise, then, that in the first 150
years of Supreme Court decisions, the Justices almost never referenced
foreign precedent to resolve a domestic issue.14 Although Chief Justice John
Marshall made an oblique reference to foreign law in McCulloch v.
Maryland, the most notable pre-modern use occurred as late as 1905, when
the Court—interpreting the Equal Protection Clause—referred to Roman,

10
See Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign
Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637; Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The
International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 273 (2006)
(recounting several political attacks on the practice, including one by Tom C. Feeney (R-FL),
who argued that “[t]he Supreme Court has insulted the Constitution by overturning its own
precedent to appease contemporary foreign laws, social trends, and attitudes” (citing Supreme
Court Ruling Reiterates Importance of Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution,
U.S. FED NEWS (Mar. 2, 2005))).
11
Parrish, supra note 10, at 645.
12
See id. (discussing the propriety of using foreign precedent); Cohen, supra note 10, at
274 (noting the controversy and its “assumption that, for better or for worse, the Court . . . was
increasingly willing to apply foreign and international law in reaching its decisions,” but
arguing “that the assumption might not be true”); Benvenuto, supra note 7; see also Harold
Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004) (arguing in
favor of the use of international law); Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to
Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004) (arguing against the use of foreign
precedent).
13
Benvenuto, supra note 7, at 2704–05.
14
Id.; see also Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J.
INT’L L. 409, 420 (2003). But see Koh, supra note 12 (citing early Supreme Court references
to the “law of nations” in relation to congressional statutes as a potential contrary example).
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Napoleonic, and Germanic law to help determine the world’s historical
recognition of “the power to deal with the estate of an absentee.”15
After World War II, the modern controversy over foreign precedent
began to percolate. Starting in the 1940s, Justice Felix Frankfurter led a
trend to cite foreign law in Supreme Court opinions, though not as the actual
rationale for the Court’s decision-making.16 Then, members of the Court
began referencing foreign precedent when interpreting the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment,” with a majority
of the Court eventually citing “laws of other countries” as “instructive for
[the Amendment’s] interpretation,” while at the same time insisting that the
“opinion of the world community” was “not controlling” on the outcome of
capital cases.17 Still, the dispute over foreign precedent did not blossom in
earnest until the 1990s, driven largely by the advocacy of five Supreme
Court Justices from across the political spectrum—Stevens, O’Connor,
Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer.18 This high-level promotion eventually led
to this practice outgrowing its Eighth Amendment roots, with some Justices
using foreign law when interpreting such varied domestic concepts as
federalism19 and even affirmative action.20
Perhaps the most controversial use of foreign precedent involved an
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses. In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion cited a conflicting decision from the European Court to support the
Supreme Court’s conclusion that it had wrongly decided the controversial
Bowers v. Hardwick case, which had found no right to homosexual

15
Benvenuto, supra note 7, at 2704–05 (citing Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist., 198 U.S.
458, 570–71 (1905)); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
16
Benvenuto, supra note 7, at 2706–08.
17
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575, 578 (2005); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
102 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion) (“The civilized nations of the world are in virtual
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 n.4 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion) (referencing “legislative
decisions” from around the world); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988)
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (singling out Europe as a guidepost of “civilized standards of
decency”).
18
Benvenuto, supra note 7, at 2711. Justice Souter, while sometimes citing foreign
precedent, was not an active advocate of the practice. Id. at 2711, n.111.
19
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that
the U.S. federal divide is not unique, and arguing that other countries use the opposite
approach from that adopted by the majority).
20
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (comparing
the Court’s view “with the international understanding of the office of affirmative action,” and
quoting from an international convention to endorse her point that affirmative action is a
temporary measure).
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sodomy.21 This was the first time the European Court had ever been cited in
the text of a Supreme Court majority opinion.22 Kennedy went on to note,
“The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral
part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing
that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal
choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.”23 In dissent, Justice Scalia
railed against this “[d]angerous dicta” by the majority, pointing out that
“[c]onstitutional entitlements” do not spring “into existence, as the Court
seems to believe, because foreign nations decriminalize conduct.”24 At
bottom, Scalia worried that carefully drawn standards based on deeply rooted
American constitutional-law concepts would be abandoned in order to follow
the crowd of other countries (especially those in Europe), to the detriment of
cherished and hard-won rights in the unique experience of the United
States.25
Of all the Supreme Court advocates in favor of citing foreign precedent in
domestic decisions, Justice Breyer has been particularly outspoken about its
benefits. He has conceded that “there may be relevant political and structural
differences between [foreign] systems and our own,” yet he continues to
believe that the experience of other countries “may nonetheless cast an
empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal
problem . . . .”26 This is true even in the context of the Establishment Clause.
For instance, Justice Breyer has admitted that foreign precedent has caused
him to be “uncertain” about the validity of his dissent in Zelman v. SimmonsHarris.27 In a 2005 debate with Justice Scalia, Breyer stated, “[O]ne of the
things I had to face from my point of view . . . [was] the fact in France they
subsidize a religious school and it isn’t the end of the earth. And the same
thing is true in Britain, other countries.”28 In other words, by looking at how
established religions operated in modern European democracies, Breyer
began to question his stated concern in Zelman that allowing government21
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003) (“[A]lmost five years before Bowers
was decided the European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to
Bowers. . . .”); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192–95 (1986).
22
See Koh, supra note 12, at 50.
23
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
24
Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for bringing foreign law into the
mix, arguing that “this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on
Americans” (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n., (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari))).
25
Id.
26
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
27
See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717–29 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
28
Federal News Service, Full Written Transcript of Scalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign Law
(Jan. 13, 2005), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts.
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funded vouchers in religious schools would cause political dissension in
society.29
Despite resistance to foreign precedent, even those who oppose the
practice acknowledge its validity to some degree. For example, in his debate
with Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia agreed,
[Y]ou can cite foreign law to show, as Justice Breyer gave an
example, to show that if the Court adopts this particular view,
the sky will not fall. You know, if we got much more
latitudinarian about our approach to the Establishment Clause,
things won’t be so bad . . . . It’s useful for that.30
And, indeed, Scalia made the occasional useful reference to foreign law as a
benchmark in some of his dissenting opinions.31 Similarly, Justice Alito
(joined by Thomas) has referred to foreign precedent to establish the
existence of Western legal traditions: “Nor is the right to same-sex marriage
deeply rooted in the traditions of other nations. No country allowed samesex couples to marry until the Netherlands did so in 2000.”32 And more
recently, Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Scalia and Thomas) noted that,
“[h]ere and abroad, people are in the midst of a serious and thoughtful public
debate on the issue of same-sex marriage . . . . They see countries overseas
democratically accepting profound social change, or declining to do so.”33
What does all this mean, then? Some Justices believe that foreign law
should be liberally used to help shed light on the interpretation of the
Constitution and to provide invaluable insight into the various potential
approaches to government and constitutional theory. For others, it is
appropriate to use foreign precedent as a window to the past to help
understand which rights are “deeply rooted” in Western tradition or “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.”34 And even those Justices who oppose the
29

Zelman, 536 U.S. at 719–29.
Federal News Service, supra note 28.
31
See McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 381–82 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing in favor of bans on “anonymous campaigning” by referencing state and
federal government parallels, as well as “the legislatures of foreign democracies: Australia,
Canada, and England, for example, all have prohibitions upon anonymous
campaigning . . . . How is it, one must wonder, that all of these elected legislators, from
around the country and around the world, could not see what six Justices of this Court see so
clearly . . . ?”); see also Koh, supra note 12 (arguing in favor of using international law and
pointing out consistencies in Scalia’s position on this issue).
32
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2715 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting).
33
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2624–25 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
34
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (recounting the legal test to
determine whether unenumerated human rights should be constitutionally protected as part of
substantive due process).
30
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use of foreign law must concede that it can serve a limited purpose as a
policy matter—perhaps merely as an object lesson to see how some policies
succeed or fail.
Under all these approaches, therefore—despite the protests of some
Justices—there is universal recognition of some legitimate purpose to consult
what the European Court (and other courts) have to say on matters that
impact domestic constitutional interpretation. Though there may be limits to
such comparisons based on the policies and philosophies of the Justices,
there is value in exploring lessons from the European Court on issues such as
the freedom of religion.
III. SYSTEM-BASED LIMITS ON COMPARING THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN
MODELS
The prior section concluded that policy-based considerations do not rule
out the validity of comparing the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court
and the European Court. One might wonder, however, whether systemic
differences between the courts are so profound as to make comparison futile.
In fact, the opposite is true. While notable structural differences do exist,
they do not invalidate the benefit of comparing how the two courts handle
religion-based claims.
When assessing judicial approaches to the freedom of religion, one can
choose among several European courts, such as the International Court of
Justice (ICJ)35 or the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).36 No
other tribunal, however, compares with the European Court—a permanent
judicial body located in Strasbourg, France, which, since 1950, has become
the arbiter of Europe’s fundamental rights under the ground-breaking
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

35

The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (UN) and a direct successor
to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), which began in 1922. It has been in
existence since 1946 as a key component of the UN Charter. RUTH MACKENZIE, CESARE
ROMANO, PHILIPPE SANDS & YUVAL SHANY, THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 4–5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2010). To individuals with concerns about
religion, however, this court is of little help, because only states may bring an action. See id.
at 12.
36
Known as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) prior to 2009 and the Treaty of Lisbon, the
CJEU is located in Luxembourg as the principal judicial organ of the European Community
(EC). See id. at 253. It is responsible for cases that involve the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights, which includes in Article 10 a provision protecting freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 10, Dec. 18, 2000,
2012/C 326/02. (EUCFR) The CJEU rarely will deliver a judgment on the topic of freedom of
religion. But see Cases of Y(C-71/11) and Z(C-99/11), ECLI:EU:C:2012:518.
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(ECHR).37 The European Court decides comparatively few religion cases in
its vast case load.38
Admittedly, there are important systemic distinctions between the
Supreme Court and the European Court. As discussed below, however, key
similarities between the courts leave ample room for drawing legitimate
parallels in their jurisprudence.
A. Differences in Structure Between the Two Courts
Four noteworthy structural distinctions separate the Supreme Court and
the European Court, relating to the foundational documents from which each
court originated, the scope of each court’s judicial review, the composition of
each court, and the enforcement of each court’s judgments. The first
difference involves the foundational documents from which each court
originated. Unlike the Supreme Court—which is authorized by a domestic
federal constitution mostly concerned with the separation of government
powers—the European Court was created by an international human rights
convention for the purpose of monitoring the Council of Europe and its
member-states.39 This distinction, however, is not overly significant in the
context of interpreting individual rights, such as the freedom of religion.
Indeed, both courts protect fundamental rights on a case-by-case basis. For
instance, in the context of cases raised by couples denied the right to marry
within their states, the Supreme Court recognized a nationwide constitutional
right to same-sex marriage.40 Similarly, in the context of an individual
complaint from Northern Ireland, the European Court recognized that the

37
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 (1950), as amended by Protocol No. 11, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. No.
155 (1994).
38
“From 1959 to 2009, the European Court . . . found a total of thirty [religion]
violations . . . . By comparison, during that same forty-year period, the Court found some 4008
violations . . . concerning the fairness and length of proceedings . . . .” Witte & Arold, supra
note 5, at 14–15; see also MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 335.
39
Created by the ECHR, the Council includes forty-seven member-states: Albania,
Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia,
Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. See Our Member States, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2017),
http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-member-states.
40
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). This action by the Court, however,
was heavily criticized by the dissenting justices as an inappropriate act of judicial legislating,
instead of constitutional interpretation.
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ECHR provided all consenting European adults the right to engage in
homosexual activity without criminal sanction.41
This focus on individual cases creates an additional similarity between the
courts. Due to its limited federal jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, the Supreme Court must wait for properly raised individual
cases before it can define fundamental rights.42 In the same way, before the
European Court can enforce human rights under the ECHR, it must await
applications from member-states, non-governmental organizations, or
individuals alleging that a member-state has violated rights secured by the
In other words, neither court can
Convention and its protocols.43
affirmatively seek out cases or target government policies to overturn.
The second structural difference involves the scope of each court’s
judicial review. Outside of a handful of cases falling within its original
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court operates as a pure appellate court, with little
competency in the first instance to find facts and assign damages.44 In
contrast, although mostly resembling an appellate tribunal, the European
Court regularly exercises fact-finding powers associated with trial courts,
including the ability to conduct an examination, complete with witnesses and
documentary evidence.45 Further, if the domestic law of a member-state
cannot provide full satisfaction for an injury, the European Court may
fashion a remedy of “just satisfaction,” with both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages.46 Undeniably, these are significant judicial powers;
however, these distinctions do not foreclose a comparison of the two courts.
Even though the European Court has distinct fact-finding and remedial
powers, it shares with the Supreme Court the key interpretive authority to
determine the scope of fundamental rights—the critical point of comparison
in religion cases.
The third structural difference involves the composition of the courts.
The Supreme Court consists of nine independent Justices with lifetime terms,
who decide all cases together and have extensive control over their own

41
See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981). Unlike the Supreme
Court, the European Court has not yet found a European consensus to recognize a
fundamental right to same-sex marriage.
42
Jeffery S. Gutman, 2.1 Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL FOR
LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS (2013), http://federalpracticemanual.org/chapter2/section1.
43
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS THE LIFE OF AN APPLICATION, http://www.echr.coe.
int/Documents/Case_processing ENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
44
See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291–92 (1982) (stating that “factfinding is
the basic responsibility of [lower] courts, rather than appellate courts” (citing DeMarco v.
United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 (1974))).
45
ECHR, art. 38.
46
Id. art. 41; MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 353–54.
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docket.47 In contrast, the European Court consists of forty-seven judges (one
from each member-state) appointed to nine-year, non-renewable terms.48
They decide cases in a single-judge formation, three-judge committees,
seven-judge Chambers, or a seventeen-judge Grand Chamber,49 and they
have little control over their docket, except in those cases accepted for final
review by the Grand Chamber.50 While these distinctions are notable, they
bear little on the key reason to compare the courts’ jurisprudence—assessing
the strengths or weaknesses of each court’s interpretation of individual
rights.
The final structural difference involves the enforcement of each court’s
judgments. Although the Supreme Court must rely on the federal political
branches to ensure the efficacy of its judgments, the Court has enjoyed
notable success even when ushering in major societal changes, such as
declaring an end to segregated schools or mandating rights to abortion and
same-sex marriage. In contrast, the European Court is not capable of
enforcing its own decisions. The judgments, though binding, are executed
under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe—a sometimes time-consuming and ineffective process.51 Worse, as
illustrated by the United Kingdom’s resistance to the European Court’s
prisoner voting cases,52 if a member-state ignores a judgment of the Court,
47

U.S. CONST., art. III, sec. 1 (providing that the Justices “shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour”); 28 U.S.C. § 1 (LexisNexis current through PL 114-327) (setting number of
Justices); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (LexisNexis current through PL 114-327) (providing for
review by writ of certiorari).
48
ECHR, arts. 20, 23(1). Member-states nominate three candidates, and the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe further elects one judge. See ECHR art. 22; MACKENZIE,
ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 337–38.
49
ECHR, supra note 37, art. 26.
50
Id. arts. 26–27; European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, rr. 24–30 (Nov. 14,
2016), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf. In the Grand Chamber, a
panel of five judges decide whether the case raises a “serious issue of general importance.”
Id. at r.73; see also ECHR, supra note 37, art. 43; Rules of Court, supra note 50, at r. 73.
51
ECHR, supra note 37, art. 46(2).
52
In a series of cases beginning in 2005, the European Court found multiple violations by
the United Kingdom regarding its failure to permit prisoners to vote in U.K. elections, in
violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR. See Hirst v. United Kingdom, 2005-IX
Eur. Ct. H.R. 187 (Oct. 6, 2005); Greens v. United Kingdom, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (Nov.
23, 2010); Firth v. United Kingdom, App. no. 47784/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 12, 2014);
McHugh v. United Kingdom, App. no. 51987/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 10, 2015). The Court
has noted the United Kingdom’s failure to follow the Hirst decision, which was met with an
enormous backlash in the United Kingdom, with some leaders even threatening to withdraw
the United Kingdom from the ECHR. The Council of Ministers has twice called upon the
United Kingdom to follow the Hirst decision; however, the United Kingdom still has not
complied. Although in 2013 a U.K. Parliamentary committee reviewed a draft bill, the U.K. is
unlikely to comply, and the government intends to write a full response to this report
sometime in 2016. See Jack Simpson Caird, Prisoner’s Voting Rights: Developments Since
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compliance can be achieved only through a delicate and sometimes
ineffective process of diplomacy.
As can be seen, none of these four structural differences poses an
insurmountable obstacle to comparing the jurisprudence of the two courts on
individual rights such as the freedom of religion. Moreover, the two courts
share other similarities in their procedures. For instance, both courts permit
third parties (such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other
states with an interest) to intervene as amicus curiae.53 This allows for full
development of the issues and for the expression of varied positions about
individual rights. Also, if there is “imminent risk of irreparable damage,”
such as loss of life or torture, both courts have the ability to preserve rights
while a case is being considered.54 Additionally, both courts use oral
argument to assist in deciding cases, although the Supreme Court hears
argument in far more cases and employs a much more active method of
questioning the advocates during those arguments.55
In sum, while structural dissimilarities may impact how the judges
operate, these differences do not nullify the legitimacy of comparing the two
courts’ jurisprudence. Indeed, as discussed below, a core “similarity of
focus” between the courts favors a comparison of their cases involving
individual rights, such as the freedom of religion.
B. Similarity of Focus: Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Margin of
Appreciation
Despite the structural differences noted above, when dealing with matters
of individual rights, the focus of the Supreme Court Justices and the
European judges is often similar. Indeed, the two courts operate in
somewhat parallel systems because the entities subject to their rulings are
sovereign states. In this way, the U.S. system of “federalism” dovetails with
the European Court’s experience as a supra-national body governed by the
principle of “subsidiarity.”
The Supreme Court has affirmed that the U.S. Constitution operates
within the bounds of federalism—a doctrine that recognizes the federal

May 2015, U.K. PARLIAMENT (Feb. 15, 2016), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/Research
Briefing/Summary/CBP-7461.
53
See ECHR, supra note 37, art. 36; Rules of Court, supra note 50, at r. 44; see also
MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 351.
54
For instance, the European Court may have the parties adopt “interim measures” while
the case is decided. MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 346 (citing
Mamatkulov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 293, para. 104 (Feb. 4, 2005)).
55
See ECHR, supra note 37, art. 40; Rules of Court, supra note 50, at r. 58–59, 63; see also
MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 351.
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government as one of delegated powers. James Madison summed up the
concept this way:
The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite . . . . The powers reserved to the several States will
extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people,
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State.56
Partly due to federalism principles, the Supreme Court polices its own
jurisdiction with constitutional and prudential doctrines, such as standing,
and by enforcing common law and statutory requirements to exhaust
remedies at the state level.57 By limiting the number and types of cases
available for federal judicial review, the Court better preserves the power of
the sovereign states to act within their own spheres of authority. This, in
turn, maintains an important constitutional balance set in place to limit the
power of the national government and to divide power in order to avoid
tyranny.
Likewise, at the European Court, the principle of subsidiarity—stemming
from the ECHR—provides that “the task of ensuring respect for the rights
enshrined in the Convention lies first and foremost with the authorities in the
Contracting States rather than with the [European] Court. The Court can and
should intervene only where the domestic authorities fail in that task.”58 Due
to this principle, the European Court strictly enforces the ECHR’s
requirement that cases be submitted within six months from the date of a
final domestic decision, and that the petitioner exhausts all ordinary,
reasonably available legal remedies through courts and channels in the
member-state.59 In addition, the European Court scrutinizes alleged human
rights violations with a strict eye to weed out cases that are unnecessary to
decide, in deference to the sovereign states living under the ECHR—much
like U.S. federal courts.
56

THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
For instance, in habeas corpus cases, a tradition of common and statutory law has
affirmed the requirement that prisoners exhaust state remedies. See Duckworth v. Serrano,
454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (“The exhaustion requirement . . . serves to minimize friction between
our federal and state systems of justice by allowing the State an initial opportunity to pass
upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights.”).
58
Interlaken Follow-Up (Note by the Jurisconsult), EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ¶ 2
(Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_Follow-up_ENG.pdf.
59
See MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 342–43.
57
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The similarity of this practice to the U.S. Supreme Court can be seen
most clearly in two European doctrines: “admissibility” and the “margin of
appreciation.”
1. Admissibility Doctrine
The European Court’s doctrine of admissibility leads to the dismissal of
most filed petitions,60 including those alleging violations of the freedom of
religion—a convenience that approximates the Supreme Court’s ability to
control its docket by dismissing most petitions for a writ of certiorari without
explanation. Additionally, this European doctrine often promotes the same
policies that undergird the Supreme Court’s Article III and prudential
justiciability doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness.
The first prong of the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine61 focuses on
whether a party was sufficiently injured to bring a federal case. In the same
way, a European Court petition may be inadmissible because it fails to
provide sufficient information about an injury, or fails to show that the
applicant “suffered a significant disadvantage.”62 As an example, in Avilkina
v. Russia, the European Court dismissed a petition by a Jehovah’s Witness
member who claimed she was injured because of her religious status when
Russia disclosed her medical files, in violation of the non-discrimination
provisions of the ECHR.63 The facts of record, however, did not back up that
alleged injury: no actual files had been disclosed for that particular
applicant.64
Another injury-related reason to dismiss a case as inadmissible involves
applicants who file “manifestly ill-founded” petitions. For instance, in Mann
Singh v. France, a Sikh complained under the ECHR when France denied
him a driver’s license because his passport photo was not “bareheaded,” as
60

Since 1998, a major case load increase at the European Court, but for example, over 90%
were inadmissible in 2013. See European Council, Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria,
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMANS (2014), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Admissibility_gui
de_ENG.pdf.
61
The doctrine of standing “serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp
the powers of the political branches . . . . To establish Article III standing, an injury must be
‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
redressable by a favorable ruling.’ ” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 nn.46–47
(2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010)) (or 561
U.S. 139, 149).
62
MACKENZIE, ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 348–50; ECHR, supra note 37,
art. 35; Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention, May. 13, 2004 arts.
7, 8, CETS 194.
63
Avilkina v. Russia, App. no. 1585/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 7, 2013).
64
Id.
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required by the rules—instead, he wore a turban to comply with his religious
mandate to wear the headpiece at all times.65 The European Court found the
application manifestly ill-founded because the rule—while clearly interfering
with the Sikh’s religious observances—was “justified in principle and
proportionate to the objective” of “public safety and protection of public
order” and necessary “due to the increased risk of fraud and forgery of
driving licenses.”66 This aspect of admissibility—seemingly judging the
merits of claims without entertaining a complete examination—grants even
greater deference to sovereign states than the U.S. Supreme Court’s standing
doctrine. Of course, the Supreme Court engages in a similar practice when it
regularly denies certiorari on cases that are not deemed important enough to
be heard by the Justices.
Other aspects of the admissibility doctrine resemble the second and third
prongs of the Supreme Court’s standing inquiry—lack of causation and lack
of redressability.67 Notably, the European Court will not entertain petitions
that bring a claim against an entity that is not a party to the Convention, or
that seek to redress a right that is not secured by the ECHR.68 In Stephens v.
Cyprus, a woman alleged under the ECHR that the United Nations had
denied her access to her home without compensation while Turkish and
Greek-Cypriot forces were fighting in the area in 1974.69 The European
Court found the complaint to be inadmissible because the United Nations
“has a legal personality separate from that of its member states and is not a
Contracting Party to the Convention . . . .”70 In other words, her claim of
injury was not within the Court’s jurisdiction.
A petition may also fail if the injury has not yet come to full fruition—the
ripeness doctrine.71 In Ligue des Musulmans de Sulsse v. Suisse, the
European Court considered a challenge to a Swiss constitutional amendment
that banned the building of Muslim minarets.72 The Court ruled the case
inadmissible because it was brought by those who did not allege that they
intended to erect such buildings in the future, and who were not direct

65

Mann Singh v. France, App. no. 4479/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 13, 2008).
Id.
67
See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.
68
See ECHR, supra note 37, art. 35; Protocol 14, supra note 62, arts. 7–8; MACKENZIE,
ROMANO, SANDS & SHANY, supra note 35, at 348–50.
69
Stephens v. Cyprus, App. no. 45267/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 28, 2007).
70
Id.
71
The ripeness doctrine helps “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative
policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.”
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967).
72
Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse v. Suisse, App. no. 66274/09 (June 28, 2011).
66
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victims of the alleged Convention violation.73 Although most scholars,
including the Swiss government itself, opined that the ban would be a
violation of the freedom of religion under the ECHR, the Court did not even
reach the question because the challenge lacked a ripe injury.
Finally, sometimes an inadmissible petition raises previously resolved
issues that no longer justify review—mootness.74 For example, in Oleksy v.
Poland, the applicant—a former Prime Minister of the nation—complained
of several deprivations of his rights as a defendant in a criminal trial, in
violation of the ECHR.75 The Supreme Court of Poland previously
overturned his conviction and required that the proceedings against the
applicant be discontinued. In light of this action at the state level, the
European Court ruled the case inadmissible because “any defects which may
have existed at the time of the applicant’s trial . . . must be considered to
have been rectified.”76 In turn “the applicant can no longer claim to be the
victim of the alleged violations of the Convention, as required by Article
34.”77
In essence, the European Court’s admissibility doctrine ensures that the
judges do not needlessly interfere with the workings of member-states. This
parallel to the Supreme Court’s practices increases the validity of
comparisons made between the jurisprudence of the two counts.
2. The “Margin of Appreciation” Doctrine
The European Court’s application of the “margin of appreciation”
doctrine also bears similarity to regular practices of the Supreme Court. The
U.S. system of federalism requires “federal courts to defer to the practices
and policies of individual states, unless there are clear violations of federal
constitutional rights . . . .”78 In the same way, the European “margin of
appreciation “doctrine was created “to address the pluralism of member
states’ legislation” and to give European nations “adequate space” to
legislate “according to their different legal traditions, social circumstances,
and cultural specificities.”79 This principle of deference “recognizes that
73
Id. (“pas plus qu’elles n’allèguent avoir l’intention d’ériger de tels bâtiments à l’avenir.
Elles ne sont donc pas directement victimes de la violation alléguée de la Convention.”).
74
“A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes
of Article III—‘when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome.’ ” Already, LLC, v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 727 (2013)
(quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam)).
75
Oleksy v. Poland, App. no. 1379/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 16, 2009).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Witte & Arold, supra note 5, at 53–54.
79
Pin, supra note 5, at 641.
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national judges are often better placed than international judges to assess
these culturally sensitive questions” regarding human rights within the
context of a particular nation’s situation.80
In the context of religion, the European Court has liberally applied the
“margin of appreciation” to a wide variety of practices. For instance, in
Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, the European Court rejected a
challenge by an ultra-orthodox Jewish organization that was denied the
ability to ritually slaughter its own meat to ensure compliance with the
group’s rigid “glatt” religious prescriptions.81 The French government
denied the group’s license under its animal cruelty laws, because another
Jewish organization had been granted the license and could provide the meat
to the applicant group.82 Displaying great deference, a Grand Chamber of
the European Court found that there had been no interference with the
applicant’s religious beliefs and that France’s rules fell within the wide
“margin of appreciation” due to member-states.83 In a very different context,
in Eweida v. United Kingdom, the two applicants were Christian employees
who opposed same-sex partnerships on religious grounds, and whose
consciences prevented them from performing job duties that furthered such
The European Court upheld their dismissals from
relationships.84
employment in the United Kingdom, in a display of its usual wide “margin
of appreciation,” noting that there was no consensus in Europe on the proper
balance between conscience and accommodations on this sensitive issue.85
This generous application of the margin of appreciation doctrine provides
significant deference to the practices of European nations where no clear
consensus has been established throughout Europe. In that sense, it is similar
to the deference the Supreme Court sometimes gives to states under
federalism principles, especially in certain areas (e.g., education, criminal
law) traditionally regulated by the states using their general police power, in
contrast to the limited and delegated powers of the national government
under the U.S. Constitution.86
In sum, because both courts are deferential to sovereign states when
crafting their judicial opinions, legitimate comparisons can be made between
the U.S. and European systems despite their differences. This is shown by
80

Witte & Arold, supra note 5, at 16.
Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 2000-vII231 Eur. Ct. H.R, (May 31, 2000).
82
Id. (concluding that the group could also easily import “glatt” meat from Belgium).
83
Id.
84
Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215 (Jan. 15, 2013).
85
Id.
86
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down a federal law that
encroached on an area of traditional state regulation); see also Antony B. Kolenc, Commerce
Clause Challenges After United States v. Lopez, 50 FLA. L. REV. 867 (1998) (discussing
commerce challenges in other areas of traditional state regulation).
81
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the European Court’s strict application of its admissibility doctrine,
reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s justiciability doctrines. It also reveals
itself in the wide margin of deference the European Court provides to
legislation and adjudications made at the member-state level, recognizing
that judges at the state level are better situated to vindicate individual rights,
such as the freedom of religion, in the unique cultural settings of their own
nations—a policy with parallels to U.S. notions of federalism.
IV. SUBJECT-MATTER-BASED LIMITS ON COMPARING THE U.S. AND
EUROPEAN MODELS
In the two prior sections, this Article established that policy
considerations from all points of the political spectrum would allow for some
comparison between the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and the
European Court. In addition, the systemic structure and similar focus of the
two courts may lend themselves to a legitimate comparison of their
respective precedents. Even if one accepts these two propositions, however,
one might still object that—at least in religion cases—the substance of the
subject matter differs too greatly between the two systems. In other words,
one could argue that the U.S. Constitution and the ECHR are too dissimilar
regarding religion to offer any useful data. This line of attack would provide
the strongest reason to be skeptical of the comparison between the two
courts. Still, as discussed below, even this consideration does not foreclose
the validity of comparing the U.S. and European jurisprudence in this area.
A. The First Amendment and Article 9
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in part, that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”87 This single sentence contains two
Religion Clauses.
The first part of the sentence—known as the
Establishment Clause—prevents government from taking steps toward
setting up a state church; while the second part—the Free Exercise Clause—
protects against government hindrances to religious faith and practice. Yet
this dearth of words has left many unanswered questions for the Supreme
Court to decide.
The Religion Clauses provide no guidance on how to adjudicate
establishment claims or assess free exercise violations. They lay out no
jurisprudential tests for the Supreme Court to apply, and they do not define
key terms, such as “respecting” or “establishment.” Indeed, the term
87

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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“religion” appears to leave non-religious conscience rights unprotected by
the First Amendment.88 All this ambiguity has left the Supreme Court with
free reign to interpret terms and define the scope of the Religion Clauses
with few textual limitations. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has struggled
over the years to define workable tests to measure these areas, leading to the
development of the oft-maligned Establishment Clause test articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,89 and the notorious rational basis view adopted in Free
Exercise Clause cases in Employment Division v. Smith.90
In contrast, Article 9 of the ECHR provides explicit guidance for the
European Court to apply when deciding freedom of religion questions.
Article 9 states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion
or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.91
The first paragraph of Article 9 defines the substantive right in detail,
protecting both private and public aspects of religion, as well as individual
and community manifestations of faith. Unlike the First Amendment, this
first paragraph expressly includes rights of conscience and non-religion
under its protective ambit.
The second paragraph of Article 9 sets forth a jurisprudential ends-means
balancing test that allows member-states flexibility in structuring their laws
to achieve proper ends (e.g., safety, health) through appropriate means
(necessary democratic legal limitations). In essence, this paragraph requires
88
See Eduardo Peñalver, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 802–04 (1997);
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1481 (1990) (concluding that the Framers excluded
conscience rights protection in the Religion Clauses, expressly rejecting an earlier version of
the First Amendment).
89
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also Antony B. Kolenc, “Mr. Scalia’s
Neighborhood”: A Home for Minority Religions?, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 819, 831–35 (2007)
(discussing the criticism of Lemon and evaluating potential replacement tests).
90
See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990); see also Kolenc, supra
note 89, at 840–42 (discussing the details of Smith).
91
ECHR, supra note 26, art. 9.
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the European Court to determine whether a member-state has interfered with
a religious right, and whether a legal basis existed for that interference.
Article 9 then mandates a balancing test to weigh whether the interference
was “necessary in a democratic society”—that is, whether it “corresponds to
a pressing social need, is proportionate to the aim pursued, and is justified by
relevant and sufficient reasons.”92 In practice, this test has proven to be
similar to the rational basis test used by the U.S. Supreme Court in its freeexercise jurisprudence.
So just how different is the subject matter of Article 9 from the U.S.
Constitution’s First Amendment? This question is best considered by
dividing the comparison between the two Religion Clauses.
B. Article 9 and the Free Exercise Clause
The differences between the First Amendment and Article 9 are not as
great as they appear when considering the Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence after Smith. In a post-Smith world, the Supreme Court applies
strict judicial scrutiny only when the government targets religion with laws
that are either not neutral or not generally applicable.93 Otherwise, the
Supreme Court’s ends-means analysis in free exercise cases approximates
the second paragraph of Article 9 of the ECHR by merely requiring that
governments possess a rational basis to regulate neutral activity that impacts
religion.
For instance, in the controversial Smith case itself, the Supreme Court
affirmed a state government’s generally applicable law that neutrally
regulated harmful controlled substances, such as the drug peyote, even
though that regulation substantially interfered with the rights of some Native
Americans who sincerely practiced a religion that considered peyote use to
be sacramental.94 The Court found that the state had neutrally sought to
protect ends that were legitimate (i.e., public health and safety) by generally
applicable means that were rationally related to those ends (i.e., prohibiting
ingestion). Thus, the fact that the law interfered with individual religious
practice was essentially a non-issue.
Similarly, consider how the European Court applies the jurisprudential
test set out in the second paragraph of Article 9. In S.A.S. v. France, the
Court upheld France’s facially neutral ban on the wear of any item that
covered the face in public, despite an acknowledgement by the Court that the
92

Witte & Arold, supra note 5, at 16.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(applying strict scrutiny to non-neutral, non-generally applicable city laws that targeted the
Santeria religion’s practice of ritual animal slaughter).
94
See generally Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
93
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ban was primarily aimed at preventing Islamic women from publicly wearing
religious garb, such as a burqa.95 The European Court rejected some of
France’s proposed ends for the ban (i.e., national security, protection of
women), but it accepted France’s end of protecting “the rights and freedom
of others” to ensure that persons can interact in public by seeing each other’s
faces.96 According to the Court, the means of accomplishing this end by
“neutrally” banning all facial coverings was “necessary in a democratic
society.”97
This ends-means analysis by the European Court approximates what the
Supreme Court would do if it treated the facts of S.A.S. under the rational
basis test articulated in Smith. The Supreme Court could potentially uphold
the ban by noting France’s legitimate aim to enhance societal interaction, and
then it could find that banning face coverings is rationally related to that end.
Of course, one might argue that the Supreme Court would instead find
France’s conduct in S.A.S. more akin to a specific discrimination against
religion, thereby causing the Justices to strike down the ban under strict
scrutiny because France is targeting Islamic garb.98 Whichever test one uses,
however, this academic exercise demonstrates that the subject matter of
religion lends itself to a valid comparison between the U.S. and European
models—at least when dealing with cases that would fall within the Free
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
C. Article 9 and the Establishment Clause
The argument in favor of comparing the jurisprudence of the two courts
becomes more challenging when dealing with cases under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. For all its detail, Article 9 of the ECHR
contains nothing that resembles a ban on the state establishment of religion.
In fact, many European nations—the United Kingdom, Denmark, Iceland,
Norway, and several others—continue legally to uphold official
establishments of religion. Some might argue that this lack of a European
Establishment Clause invalidates any attempt to compare religion cases
between the two systems. This would overstate the problem, however, and
ignore important areas of commonality.
Admittedly, the lack of an Establishment Clause in the ECHR makes it
difficult to find many helpful comparisons with certain European cases. For
instance, in Ásatrúarfélagid v. Iceland, the European Court dismissed the
claim of a minority religious group that complained about Iceland’s system
95
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of “parish charges” collected from income taxes.99 The European Court
found the application to be manifestly ill-founded because Iceland’s
explanation about why it needed to pay extra “tithes” to the state-supported
national church was “reasonable.”100 Of course, this kind of tithing system
could never occur in the United States., specifically because of the existence
of the Establishment Clause. Still, one might find a useful comparison
between the cases even in this situation. For instance, the European Court’s
analysis of this issue explored whether Iceland’s tithing system neutrally
treated all religions comparably, and whether Iceland had a reasonable
explanation for extra funds going to the state-established church.
The very existence of a “neutrality principle” in the European system may
be due, in part, to the emphasis on neutrality in U.S. Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Indeed, this may be an example of the Supreme Court’s
influence on the European Court, persuading that court to use a stricter
approach in some cases than the ECHR might otherwise require. For
instance, in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, the European
Court found that Moldova had violated Article 9 when it refused to legally
recognize a “schismatic” Orthodox Christian sect that refused to reconcile
with a larger Orthodox Church that was already recognized by the state.101
In essence, Moldova had refused to recognize the sect because it had
assessed “the legitimacy of religious beliefs” of the group, and had impacted
its legal rights. Despite a difficult political environment—Moldova had
recently emerged from the Soviet Union and this dispute actually may have
been part of a proxy clash between Russia and Romania—the European
Court found a violation of “the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality” in
harming the sect’s legal rights under Moldovan law.102 This case applied the
neutrality principle in a way that lines up well with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause ruling in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, where
the Justices nullified a Georgia law that required a jury in a church property
dispute to determine which side of the dispute was more faithful to the
religion’s tenets.103 The Court found that “First Amendment values are
plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the
resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and
practice.”104
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Therefore, if Europeans have found a neutrality principle in Article 9,
there may be room to draw parallels with U.S. Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, which also hinges on the concept of government neutrality. In
essence, even the lack of an Establishment Clause in Article 9 does not
destroy all meaningful comparison between the two courts’ jurisprudence in
this area because there is more overlap than one might think.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court continues to reference foreign precedent in its
decisions that interpret the U.S. Constitution, especially taking stock of the
jurisprudence of the Western world and the European Court. Scholars in
recent years have also taken an increased interest in the European Court, and
many of them have examined how the Europeans are resolving difficult
questions involving the freedom of religion. Are such comparisons between
the courts valid? Absolutely.
Although some Justices have raised policy concerns about the propriety
of citing foreign precedent, even the staunchest opponent to the practice
succumbs to the temptation from time to time, comparing how other courts
around the world have handled problems the Supreme Court may encounter.
Yet, even those who most strongly support the consultation of foreign law in
domestic issues have recognized that international norms and practices are, at
best, guidelines or models for the Supreme Court—not binding precedent to
be forced upon the American people.
When it comes to the European Court in particular, several structural
differences in the composition of the court, its mission, and its procedures
warrant some caution when drawing comparisons with the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. Still, both courts operate in systems that require deference to
sovereign states. Indeed, the focus of both courts require a similar judicial
temperament when handling alleged human rights violations by memberstates. More important, both courts have the final word on interpreting the
scope of individual human rights under their respective systems. On balance,
then, none of the structural differences destroy the validity of comparing the
jurisprudence of the two courts, perhaps even searching for lessons and
benchmarks to implement in the other system.
Finally, there are notable differences between the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and Article 9 of the ECHR. Indeed, the subject matter of
each system’s religion protections must ultimately limit the extent to which
comparisons can be drawn between the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
and the European Court on the topic of religion. In particular, the absence of
an Establishment Clause in Europe is the greatest difference, requiring the
most caution when comparing this jurisprudence. Yet, accepting those
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caveats, scholars and judges still may find good use in comparing the
freedom of religion cases from the European Court with those in the United
States.
There may even be some lessons the Americans can learn from Europe
when it comes to interpreting the Religion Clauses in the future.

